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1. Introduction 
 
In April 2003, the EU Accession Agreement was officially signed for the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic. These countries are destined to become EU members in May 2004. As part 
of the “acquis communautaire”, participation in the new version of the exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM II), and subsequently in the European Monetary Union (EMU) is 
obligatory for all new EU members (no opt-out clause is available). Therefore, the question 
today for the accession countries is no longer whether or not to enter the eurozone but rather 
the time horizon when the entry should happen. 
More specifically, as a condition for EMU membership, a country must be prepared to 
adopt the euro as the single currency and be able to meet the obligations arising from the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The formal condition for a country's preparedness to adopt the 
single currency is the fulfilment of a set of nominal convergence criteria, the so-called 
Maastricht criteria.  
Although the Central-Eastern European countries (CEECs) are following strikingly 
different patterns of economic policy (from currency board arrangements to managed floating 
coupled with inflation targeting monetary strategies2) the endpoint is the same: by around 
2010 all of them wish to join the monetary union, fully harvesting the possible gains of the 
single market. So far the most ambitious time-schedule was announced by the Hungarian 
government: in July 2003 it declared the intention to introduce the euro by 1 January 2008 
(Government of the Republic of Hungary [2003] pp. 11-20). 
The paper is organized as follows. First, I will outline the legal regulations concerning 
the Economic and Monetary Union, and evaluate the preparedness of the whole region in 
general. Then in Section 3, a detailed picture about Hungarian macroeconomic tendencies will 
be offered, in light of the above mentioned criteria. Section 4 will discuss the feasibility of the 
2008 target date, and set out the arguments regarding the optimal timing of eurozone entry. 
Section 5 will conclude.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the conference on “Institutional and Policy Diversity – Its role in Economic Development”, 
Debrecen, Hungary, 3-5, November 2003. László Jankovics is an assistant lecturer at University of Debrecen, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Economics e-mail: 
laszlo.jankovics@econ.unideb.hu 
 
2 See Begg et al.[2001] and Buiter - Grafe [2001] for more details about the differing paths of the CEECs during 
the run-up to the euro.  
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2. Legal and economic aspects of the eastward expansion of the eurozone 
 
The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU) lays down a very specific 
procedure for joining, which demands meeting accurate targets over specific time periods 
(‘reporting periods’). Once a country has become the member of the EU, it can also join the 
modified European exchange rate mechanism, the ERM II. The first four criteria (i.e. public 
debt, current fiscal deficit, long-term interest rates and inflation) must be satisfied on data 
from the year prior to the evaluation date. The reporting period for the fifth main criteria – 
ERM II membership without devaluation – is two years according to the TEU, hence the 
evaluation in this case cannot be made until a two-year track record exists3.  
Furthermore, the Accession Treaties clearly stipulates the legal requirements of joining 
the European institutions. It is fair to say that participation in the Economic and Monetary 
Union and consequently meeting the Maastricht criteria is not an option but an obligation for 
the accession states. „Each of the new Member States shall participate in Economic and 
Monetary Union from the date of accession as a Member State with a derogation within the 
meaning of Article 22 of the EC Treaty.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2003])  
As I argued, in a legal sense the new member states will have to proceed towards the 
eurozone. It is important to bear in mind however, that there is a strong camp in the EU which 
oppose a quick expansion of the monetary union (the most famous spokesperson of this group 
is Ernst Welteke, incumbent president of the Bundesbank). Besides this, some of the 
applicants also want to slow down the process, postponing the abandonment of monetary 
sovereignty past 2010 (Mladek [2003]).  
It is certainly worth analyzing whether the transition countries are matured 
economically at all for the single currency. In the academic literature almost all the 
evaluations are based on the famous concept of “Optimum Currency Area” (OCA)4. If we 
look at the essential considerations of the theory, we must come to the conclusion that the 
CEECs are at least as suitable for monetary unification as were the present eurozone countries 
at their time of joining (see for example Gros [2000], Kopits [2002] and Csajbók-Csermely 
[2002] pp. 15-82.). The similarity to the Western European economic structures, the 
diversified sectoral structure in the region, the existence of equalising mechanisms to 
accommodate potential asymmetric shocks –all measures on which the newcomers do not 
score significantly worse than the present members. There are also aspects from which the 
picture is even better: for example the accession countries are more integrated (more 
embedded) into the single market in terms of international trade volumes than some of the old 
EU states. Table 1 shows economic interdependences ranking together the present and new 
Member States.  
 
                                                 
3 It is interesting to note however, that in May 1998 Italy’s and Finland’s formal ineligibility were overlooked by 
the European Commission and the European Monetary Institute (the precursor of the ECB), disregarding the fact 
that Italy had been in the ERM for only 15 months before the evaluation and Finland for only 16 months. 
4 See the seminal papers of Mundell [1961] and McKinnon [1963] for details of the classical theory, and Horvath 
[2003] for a contemporary evaluation. 
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Table 1. Intensity of trade relations in Europe in 1999 
  
EMU trade/GDP EMU trade/Total trade 
Belgium 81,4 56,8 
Hungary 73,2 68,7 
Czech Republic 65,1 61,7 
Estonia 62,0 45,1 
Slovenia 61,8 67,1 
Slovakia 58,9 56,8 
Netherlands 48,8 47,9 
Ireland 44,2 33,2 
Bulgaria 39,3 54,2 
Portugal 38,5 67,1 
Austria 37,6 63,2 
Romania 34,7 66,4 
Latvia 30,9 46,8 
Poland 27,6 58,5 
Lithuania 26,5 36,0 
Spain 25,5 58,3 
France 21,7 51,9 
Germany 20,8 43,8 
Finland 20,7 34,0 
Italy 19,5 49,3 
Greece 17,4 53,4 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
From the data it is striking that the transition countries are far more concentrated 
toward the European Union. Consequently the single currency could eliminate the exchange 
rate risk for a larger share of foreign trade. If we look at other economic variables, over the 
last couple of years in the region the achievements in some aspects are undisputed. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 present some figures on recent macroeconomic performance.  
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Figure 1. Average CPI in selected transition economies 
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Source: Kopint-Datorg [2003] pp. 28.  
 
 
Figure 2. Real GDP in selected transition economies 
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Source: Kopint-Datorg [2003] pp. 27.  
 
It is noticeable from the comparison in Figure 1 that the CEECs achieved low levels of 
price increases, and inflation remained in moderate levels despite the variety of exogenous 
shocks during the given period (Asian and Russian financial crises; the collapse of the stock 
exchanges and the myth of the “new economy”; substantial increases in world commodity 
prices). It is also evident from Figure 2 that transition countries have remained resilient to the 
sluggishness of the global economy. Growth in the region after 2000 certainly slowed down, 
but still outpaces the global economies, not to mention the EU average. The consolidation and 
stabilization of the accession states’ economies lays down the foundation for continuing real 
convergence in economic development and the adoption of the single currency over the 
medium term.  
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3. The Hungarian macroeconomic picture in the light of the euro 
 
After Hungary's EU-accession scheduled to May 2004, entry into the Economic and 
Monetary Union will be the next major step in the country's European integration. EMU-entry 
will eventually entail giving up the national currency and introducing the euro as the domestic 
means of payment. 
As mentioned above, the Hungarian government was among the first in the region to 
declare an ambitious target date to adopt the single currency. Certainly a well-defined 
macroeconomic path is attached to this plan, since fulfilling the Maastricht criteria would 
require disciplined, or sometimes harsh economic policies. Table 2 gives us some insight 
about the recent trends of the Hungarian economy. 
 
Table 2. Hungarian macroeconomic indicators 1996-2002 (percentage points) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP 1,3 4,6 4,2 4,9 5,2 3,8 3,3 
Exports  7,4 26,4 16,7 12,4 21 8,8 3,8 
Imports 5,7 24,6 22,8 13,3 19,4 6,1 6,1 
CPI 23,6 18,3 14,3 10 9,8 9,2 5,3 
Unemployment rate 10,1 8,9 8 7,1 6,5 5,6 5,6 
Current Account % of GDP -0,9 -0,6 -2 -2,3 -3,2 -2 -2,8 
Government balance % of 
GDP -3 -4,6 -9 -5,3 -2,6 -4,5 -9,2 
 
Source: Kopint-Datorg [2003] pp. 53.  
 
The data clearly show that overall economic growth is slowing in Hungary, in reaction 
to a contraction in corporate investment spending and exhausting export activities. In the short 
term, it can be argued that recent export performance has been a result of weak growth in the 
main European trading partners. However, deeply-seated factors can be found in a loss of 
competitiveness due to several years of unsustainably large real wage increases, steady 
currency appreciation in real terms, and a declining rate of manufacturing productivity 
performance. With a tight labour market, relatively high wages and just a few remaining 
privatization projects, there is little chance that massive foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
can counter these factors. During the second half of the 90s a healthy capital account 
dominated by large FDI inflows could finance the current account deficit without increasing 
the foreign debt of the country5. In fact, increasing capital exports by Hungarian large 
corporations (e.g. MOL, OTP, MATÁV) will undercut any positive impact on external 
financing, although it might help the income balance of the current account by repatriating 
profits and dividends later.  
As recently as 2001-2002, the inflation criteria was said to be the toughest challenge 
for Hungary among the Maastricht set. Since then, election politics substantially overwrote all 
projections, and the last two governments (the Orbán- and the Medgyessy governments) 
expansionary economic programmes caused budget irrationality, with subsequent spillovers 
into the current account and fiscal deficit. Although the outstanding 2002 budget deficit was 
partly a function of consolidation of one-off items, such factors were estimated to account for 
                                                 
5 See Bokros [2000] for patterns of the recent economic boom in Hungary in regional comparison.  
 6
4% of GDP last year. This suggests that the deficit excluding these one-off items would 
otherwise had been around 5,3-5,5%, which is still high, but not extraordinary compared with 
Hungary’s regional neighbours. Nevertheless, the markets remained unconvinced by the 
governments’ commitment in balancing the budget over the medium term consistent with the 
respective Maastricht criteria. Although the government emphasizes the need to pursue an 
increasingly tight fiscal position, meeting fiscal targets within the political context of a narrow 
parliamentary majority and with 2006 general election looming on the horizon will be 
difficult. Furthermore, Kopits – Szekely [2003] emphasized that during the next couple of 
years additional fiscal costs will emanate from meeting the EU standards and regulations on 
fields as diverse as environment, institution building, transportation and taxation.  
It is important to stress here that the lively debate concerning the mechanisms and the 
very logic of the Stability and Growth Pact6 should not be interpreted as a relaxation of the 
fiscal criteria. First, it is always different what rules are governing the insiders and the 
outsiders of the club. Second, there is a palpable pressure on the accession states to undergo 
the same purgatory, which was set in Maastricht back in 1992.  
In the field of monetary and exchange rate policy, the last 12 months was overly 
intriguing. In the first half of January 2003 strong hot capital inflows (driven by speculation 
on the forint-band widening) strengthened the national currency which reached the upper limit 
of the fluctuation band. As a result the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) had to intervene 
directly and bought up approximately 5 billion euros within two days. Furthermore, the 
central bank cut its key interest rate in 2 steps from 8.5% to 6.5%, limited access to two-week 
depo facility, and widened the interest rate channel from +/- 100bp to +/- 300bp7.  
These responses to the speculation proved to be successful, as the outflow of 
speculative capital did not jeopardize the stability of the financial system and the band was 
defended successfully (Barabás [2003]). As a result, the bulk of the speculative money had 
left the country by late May; however, the forint did not weaken and remained stable during 
this period. The reason behind this is that central bank was selling previously bought up extra 
reserves by using silent interventions. This instrument kept the exchange rate stable, somehow 
artificially, around 245 Ft/euro. At the end of May the NBH decided to withdraw from the 
foreign exchange market and restore its former practice of influencing exchange rate 
movements primarily via interest rate changes.  
A second issue, which had an impact of further weakening the forint was a policy 
measure on 4 June 2003. The central bank and the Government jointly depreciated the centre 
of the intervention band by 2.26% in order to prevent any excessive appreciation of the 
currency and to contribute to improving the international competitiveness of Hungarian 
economy and the Hungarian exporters. The new upper limit was set at 240.01/EUR (the 
former 234.69), 324.71/EUR (317.52) the lower limit and 282.36/EUR (276.1) the central 
parity. According to official reasoning, the monetary council evaluated the situation as the 
agreement provides them still enough room for manoeuvre within the new intervention band 
and due to several favourable impacts on inflation (such as deflation in Germany, slower than 
expected growth in Hungary), inflation targets are not in danger at a lower exchange rate. The 
Central bank was of the opinion that its inflation targets (4.5% for year-end 2003 and 
3.5%±1% for year-end 2004) can be met with an exchange rate of 250-260/EUR, and 
245/EUR is not a must if the government implements its promised immediate fiscal 
adjustment program of HUF 79 billion.  
However, timing and communication of the decision was heavily criticized, since the 
forint was on a weakening trend already and there was no official comment beforehand. 
                                                 
6 See Benczes [2003] for details. 
7 For a thorough discussion of the instruments of Hungarian monetary policy see NBH [2002] pp. 89-122. 
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Consequently, the market was not only surprised but very confused. After the band shift was 
announced the forint weakened drastically and hit 270/EUR. Policy makers had to take 
immediate actions to calm down markets and the NBH hiked its interest rate to 9.5% in two 
steps in June. 
According to market analysts and some academics the basic problem of the current 
monetary regime is a dangerous mix of both exchange rate and inflation targeting (Jonas – 
Mishkin [2003]. This kind of mix makes the country vulnerable and exposed to speculative 
attacks given the fully open capital account. The practice of the central bank was to declare a 
certain exchange rate band inside the wider official bands, which was deemed to be 
compatible with the inflation target. The coexistence of the two targets made the interest rate 
policy too volatile, triggering aggressive rate cuts and hikes as a reaction to currency market 
developments. 
 
4. The debate about the timing of eurozone entry 
 
In a thorough analysis the research staff of the National Bank of Hungary made the 
economic case for the “as soon as possible” approach concerning the introduction of the 
single currency (Csajbók-Csermely [2002]). They estimated significant net gains, assuming 
that euro area membership might raise the Hungarian GDP by 0.6 to 0.9  percent in terms of a 
20-year term average. Postponing the adoption of the euro consequently would mean 
sacrificing this additional growth potential. The present government is seemingly convinced 
by this set of arguments, since the declared 2008 target date is appropriate for this as soon as 
possible line. The NBH immediately endorsed this schedule. However, there is a recurring 
debate concerning the optimal timing of the eurozone entry, and, in my opinion, it can be 
taken for granted that over the next couple of years, this topic will be hotly discussed among 
economic and political circles.  
There are several often-cited counterarguments which aim to postpone the introduction 
of the euro past 2010. I would like to raise these points, and the argue for the present 
timetable, although I’m fully aware of the political and economic difficulties to overcome in 
order to preserve the plan.  
First, one can argue that meeting the official target would require artificially quick 
disinflation and a fiscal straitjacket. Nonetheless, Csaba [2002] pointed out that although the 
common currency has become effectively a new entry barrier for the CEECs, it should not be 
seen as an obstacle on the road towards full integration. Rather, it is an incentive for 
governments to make further fiscal adjustments, and to continue the disinflation process. In 
this context, the fulfilment of the strict macroeconomic criteria is possible in the coming years 
if the political commintment is provided. Moreover, as the events of the last economic crises 
proved, the required solid policies are in the self-interest of the accession countries.  
It is important to note here that the recently experienced harsh disagreement inside the 
EU concerning the application of the Stability and Growth Pact should not be interpreted as a 
relaxation of the fiscal criteria. Furthermore, a more balanced budget position will be required 
by the core European institutions.  
Second, the postponement of the euro accession would mean that the CEECs could 
continue their sovereign monetary and exchange rate policies to accommodate exogenous 
shocks during the catching-up process, or even to react to asymmetric shocks (e.g. devalue the 
national currency in case of unfavourable demand shifts on the world markets). However, 
retaining the autonomy of monetary policy and the national currency is very dangerous amid 
free capital flows. All the accession states fully liberalized the capital account in accordance 
with their international obligations and EU law harmonization process. 
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Besides the standard shocks that all open emerging market countries could face, 
accession states could face a specific external shock: the so-called convergence play. This 
refers to large capital inflows stimulated by interest rate expectations ahead of EMU 
accession. Adopting the euro would mean the complete elimination of the currency risk 
premium and a sizeable decline on default risk premium. Therefore, investors could 
reasonably expect a sharp reduction in interest rates on debt (fixed-icome) instruments issued 
by these countries, that would allow them to reap capital gains. Experiences in the Southern 
member states confirm the view that foreign investors have an incentive to play on the 
convergence of interest rates to EMU average. The resulting massive portfolio invesments 
would appreciate the currency and force the central bank to cut the base rate. However, 
reducing interest rates could conflict with the disinflation process, because it could stimulate 
domestic demand and thus contribute to the inflationay pressures in the economy8. And more 
incoherently, the latter could require the national bank to hike the interest rates again, which 
makes the countries debt market more attractive to financial institutions. This can result in 
accelerated interest rate and exchange rate volatility, itself quite harmful for other sectors of 
the economy. These unwanted nominal fluctuations can easily attract speculative money into 
the country, as seen in the January 2003 crisis in the Hungarian financial markets. In other 
words, retaining the national money throughout this peroid (mainly as a member country of 
the ERM II) could expose the country to potentially disruptive capital flows (Neményi [2003], 
Polgár [2003]).  
Third, it is also mentioned that it would be a serious mistake to irreverersibly fix the 
national currency to the euro at an overvalued parity. It certainly would be a folly, but as 
Oblath [2003] emphasized recently, this has no connection with the concrete timing of the 
accession. To set an economically justified rate would depend on the rationality and 
competence of the Hungarian decision-makers, and partly on the same skills of the European 
institutions since the final exchange rate are decided jointly. It is possible to set a sustainable 
rate for 2008, and for 2012 as well.  
Csaba [2003] wrapped up the debate succinctly, arguing that the whole discussion 
might have made sense before the announcement of the target date, but after the publication 
of the official timetable it would be foolish to create uncertainty around the commitment. 
There is a very good chance that the adandonment of the 2008 target would lead to a complete 
loss of trust towards economic policy, and there are ample instructive examples of the 
possible consequences of such a crisis situation in a globalized world economy.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
After the EU-accession the next major challenge will be preparation and finally the 
introduction of the single currency for the Central Eastern European countries. So far, 
Hungary has adopted the most ambitious plan by setting its target date for 2008. In this paper, 
I analyzed the legal, economic and political factors regarding the preparedness of the country 
alongside the whole region. After taking the pros and cons of the official “as soon as possible” 
strategy into consideration, we can conclude that there is no convincing case for postponing 
eurozone entry. Furthermore, putting off the date indefinitely or ambiguously could result in 
growing economic uncertainty and dangerous financial instability; in other words, slower 
convergence in every term to the European average.  
Nevertheless, to argue for the early adoption of the single currency doesn’t mean to 
advocate the option of unilateral euroization. There is an influential academic circle in Europe 
                                                 
8 This conflict is even more serious in a country like Hungary pursuing an inflation targeting monetary system.  
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(Bratkowski  - Rostowski [2000], Coricelli [2002], Nuti [2002]) who support this solution. 
However, if we carefully investigate the political and economic consequences of unilateral 
euroization,9 we see that the presumed benefits would probably not exceed the costs and risks 
implied by such a step. Given the sharp rejection of euroization by all European institutions, it 
is not worth adopting the single currency unilaterally, since the related benefits are ambiguous 
and vague, but the risks and costs are present and substantial. 
It is important to emphasize here that there is no precedent so far for missing a 
publicly announced EMU target date in Europe. It is very likely that Hungary would suffer a 
serious loss of reputation and credibility were it to become the first who could not make it on 
schedule. Simply, there is no other reasonable way but to keep the plan, be sufficiently 
committed and achieve the technically still feasible target. Lack of strong political 
commitment could unfortunately easily lead to a postponement of the adoption of the single 
currency. Such potential implications might well be debated, but no doubt would be serious in 
terms of reputation and economic development.  
 
                                                 
9 See Backé- Wójcik [2002] and Jankovics [2002] for a detailed analyis of the counterarguments.  
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